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“Il faut défendre la subjectivité”: Vulnerability         
in Levinas’s Ethics 
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Levinas conceived ethics as a contestation of the ontological 
imperialism and its asphyxiating order dominating Western 
culture, arguing that, rather than ontology, ethics is first 
philosophy. Supported and led by a phenomenological 
description of the concrete life of the embodied subject, his 
philosophical work achieves a radical critique of the sovereign 
subject by emphasizing the exceptional ethical significance of 
subjectivity. This paper discusses three key features that, 
according to Levinas, define human subjectivity, namely, 
vulnerability, passivity, and weakness, stressing how he thinks 
of subjectivity in terms of both welcoming and persecution at 
one and the same time. Lastly, by relying on Butler’s critique of 
the Levinasian ethics, the paper addresses Levinas’s take on 
politics, pointing out why political issues enter his ethical 
discourse. 
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Introduction: Subjectivity must be defended. 
Il faut défendre la subjectivité (“it is necessary to defend 
subjectivity”): this was the answer given by Levinas, at the 
Société française de Philosophie in Paris in 1962, during the 
discussion that followed the presentation entitled Transcendence 
and Height, in order to explain his criticism against the 
oppression of the subject by the State, against “the element of 
violence in the State, in the hierarchy” (Levinas, 1996, p. 23). 
This formulation calls to mind the renowned title of Foucault’s 
lecture course “Il faut défendre la société” (“Society must be 
defended”) that took place fourteen years later, in 1976, just 
around the corner, at the Collège de France. At that time, 
Foucault was concerned with the genealogy of power and 
knowledge, and he delved into the analysis of the effects of 
domination and subjugation in concrete manifestations of 
power. Beneath the “great absolute power […] of sovereignty,” 
he glimpsed the emergence of what he calls the “power of 
regularization,” which relies on the “technology of biopower” 
that is politically exerted over and scientifically experimented 
on human beings “insofar as they are living beings” (Foucault, 
2003, p. 247). 
Although from different perspectives, and following 
different methodological paths, as Visker (1999, pp. 115–143) 
has noted, this same concern towards the concrete life of 
individuals and the power embedded in everyone’s life can be 
identified in Levinas’s statement above. In what follows, this 
paper discusses three key features that, according to Levinas, 
define human subjectivity: vulnerability, passivity, and 
weakness (section 2); how Levinas thinks of subjectivity in 
terms of both welcoming and persecution at one and the same 
time (section 3); Levinas’s path towards politics, that is to say, 
why political questions enter his ethical discourse (section 4); 
Butler’s analysis on vulnerability, which extends the reasoning 
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to the biopolitical challenges for a global ethics. In so Doing, the 
precontractual dimension is attained, suggesting the possible 
scope for a phenomenologically oriented radical political 
enquiry (section 5). 
 
A power made of impotencies: Vulnerability and 
Responsibility. 
Extreme vulnerability, radical passivity, and originary 
weakness: these are the key features defining human 
subjectivity as it is described in Levinas’s ethics via a particular 
phenomenological method (Levinas, 2011, p. 183; 1979, pp. 28–
29). All these phenomenological findings concur in presenting 
the ethical significance arising directly from the core of the 
“constituted, willful, imperialist subject” (Levinas, 2011, p. 112), 
of modern man, who is “merely concerned to maintain the 
powers of his sovereignty” (Levinas, 1989, p. 78). 
Levinas’s “ethical metaphysics” (Bergo, 1999, p. 37) aims 
at the unDoing “of the substantial nucleus of the ego” (Levinas, 
2011, p. 141), so that the “extraordinary and everyday event of 
my responsibility for the faults or the misfortune of others” 
(Levinas, 2011, p. 10) begins to make sense thanks to an 
alternative, phenomenological consideration of ontological 
subjectification itself (Calin, 2008; Bernasconi, 2018). 
Vulnerability characterises subjectivity “qua signification, 
qua one-for-another,” which can be traced back to the 
“vulnerability of the ego, to the incommunicable, non-
conceptualizable, sensibility” (Levinas, 2011, p. 14). 
Accordingly, one of the key questions of moral philosophy – i.e. 
what is the origin of responsibility? – is tackled by Levinas 
when he describes the very subjectivity of human beings as 
“extreme vulnerability,” a condition that signals an 
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irrecoverable “divergency between the ego and the self” 
(Levinas, 1987, p. 149). 
Bernasconi (2018, pp. 261–263) remarks that this duality, 
of the me and the self, had already been glimpsed by Levinas in 
his early works during the 1930s, such as 1934 Reflections on the 
Philosophy of Hitlerism (Levinas, 1990b), 1935 On Escape (Levinas, 
2003a), and 1947 Existence and Existents (Levinas, 1978). After 
noting that Levinas reconducts both suffering and enjoyment to 
the duality of the me and the self, Bernasconi further explains 
that the subject is exposed to wounding in enjoyment (he 
quotes Levinas, 2011, p. 64), and that this wounding is 
understood as vulnerability, “following its etymology back to 
the Latin vulnerabilis,” a term that becomes crucial by 1970, 
insofar as it refers to the openness to the other, which is said to 
take the form of vulnerability (Bernasconi 2018, pp. 268–269; 
Levinas, 2003b, p. 64). Thus, vulnerability turns out to be one’s 
own vulnerability, and, therefore, at the same time, 
vulnerability entails the experience of the sudden collapse of 
the autonomy of the subject construed as a self-sufficient, 
sovereign subject.  
According to Levinas’s phenomenological 
reinterpretation of the “concreteness of egoism” (1979, p. 38), 
the me finds itself vulnerable even in the most elementary acts 
of existence, such as while at rest. This raises, and indeed has 
raised, an array of essential problems in Levinas’s account of 
ethics. To remain with the question of responsibility, for 
instance, it is worth noting that, during a conversation held in 
1975 (just a year after Otherwise than being appeared), Levinas 
tackles the following question from the audience: “If I am 
vulnerable as you emphasize in your books, how can I be 
responsible? If one suffers, one can no longer do anything.” 
Levinas’s answer to this question gives him the opportunity to 
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clarify how he arrived at his critique of the sovereignty of the 
subject (1998a, p. 83): 
By vulnerability, I am attempting to describe the subject as 
passivity. If there is not vulnerability, if the subject is not 
always in his patience on the verge of an already senseless pain, 
then he posits himself for himself. In this case, the moment at 
which he is substance is not far away; the moment at which he 
is pride, at which he is imperialist, at which he has the other 
like an object. The endeavor was to present my relationship 
with another not as an attribute of my substantiality, not as an 
attribute of my hardness as a person, but on the contrary as the 
fact of my destitution, of my deposition (in the sense in which 
one speaks of the deposition of a sovereign). 
The phenomenological account of ethics finds in vulnerability 
the way to that “radical passivity” (Levinas, 2003b, p. 63), 
which discloses the pre-original involvement in the relationship 
with the Other. As Critchley rightly recalls, the ethical relation 
takes place at the level of sensibility, not at the level of 
consciousness, and the subject’s “sentient vulnerability or 
passivity” (2002, p. 21) towards others takes place “on the 
surface of the skin, at the edge of the nerves” (Levinas, 2011, p. 
15). That is why the irreducible face-to-face relationship is 
described by Levinas as an asymmetrical, singularizing bond in 
which all the powers and rights of the alleged autonomous 
subject are irrevocably destroyed. The extreme vulnerability on 
the one hand, and the absolute passivity of the embodied 
subject on the other, define the dual system of moral obligation 
established between the me and the Other (Franck, 2008). 
In order to provide concrete examples of the alterity of the 
Other, Levinas draws on biblical figures, such as the widow 
and the orphan, the stranger, and the poor man, whereas the 
me is “the rich or the powerful” (1989, p. 48). However, the 
power and richness of the self-sufficient subject, or 
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“hypostasis,” are traumatically and concretely undermined by 
the very presence of the Other, which imposes him/herself just 
because s/he is Other and “this alterity is incumbent on [the] 
me with a whole charge of indigence and weakness” (Levinas, 
2011, pp. 17–18). If the hypostasis of the subject represents the 
ontological core suitable for the grounding of its autonomy, the 
incumbent weakness of the Other causes the “coring out” of 
enjoyment (Levinas, 2011, pp. 64 and 181), that is, of the very 
egoity or substantiality of the subject. 
In Levinas’s account of ethics, a certain philosophical 
anthropology, based on egoism and enjoyment pursued via the 
conatus towards satisfaction, is maintained only to be radically 
criticised and also in order to emphasise the “disquietude” 
(Levinas, 1979, p. 149) experienced right in the midst of the 
ego’s life. As Peperzak has noted (1980, p. 93), the egoism-
enjoyment synergy is the first step taken by the soul in 
pursuing the good, but this synergy expresses no mere attitude; 
rather, it is an ontological structure that constitutes the subject 
in its substantiality and separation. 
The entire phenomenological effort expressed by Levinas 
in breaching the ontological self-centred interiority by 
describing the ethical meaning woven into the concrete life of 
the embodied subject, leads to a particular notion of 
“responsibility,” construed as “a power made of ‘impotencies’” 
(1986, p. 354). Impotency which is also a power: this means that 
the burden of responsibility does not prevent the subject from 
assuming all its duties; rather, it discloses an exponentially 
increasing obligation. Indeed, responsibility is “infinite,” 
because it increases “in the measure it is assumed” and “duties 
become greater in the measure that they are accomplished” 
(1979, p. 244). Responsibility from vulnerability is “absolute” 
(Levinas, 1998a, p. 84) because it pushes the me to the point of a 
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“substitution” that goes one way only (Levinas, 1998a, p. 84; 
2011, p. 119). 
Along with this “hyperbolic notion of responsibility” 
(Bernasconi, 2002, p. 236), the weakness of the Other infects, so 
to speak, the sovereign subject in what is its most crucial and 
fundamental feature, that feature that defines the sense of the 
word ‘power’ when ascribed to a human being, namely, the 
liberty of acting in self-determination as an autonomous 
individual. Thus, Levinas’s fundamental thesis on the primacy 
of ethics over ontology implies that the ethical subject is a weak 
subject, and, as Jacques Derrida has noted, the thought of 
substitution goes back to “a force that is nonetheless made 
vulnerable by a certain weakness,” and leads towards “a logic 
that is hardly thinkable, almost unsayable” (Derrida, 1999, p. 
70). 
 
Host and Hostage. 
In the asymmetrical relationship with the Other, proximity 
turns out to be a traumatic exposure to alterity that incessantly 
upsets subjectification. The very notion of ‘subject’ takes on a 
crucial, different meaning, which Levinas emphasises by 
drawing on the Latin etymology of the noun: “[t]he self is a sub-
jectum; it is under the weight of the universe, responsible for 
everything” (2011, p. 116). Face-to-face with the Other, the 
subject finds itself responsible before it has any comprehension 
of what freedom can be, and before any agency. The 
significance of the responsibility faced by the subject is prior to 
both conscious acceptance and linguistic mutual exchange or 
agreement. The very identity of the subject “comes from the 
impossibility of escaping responsibility, from the taking charge 
of the other,” so that it is no longer possible to discuss ethical 
issues anonymously, since “[t]he subject which is not an ego, 
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but which I am, cannot be generalized, is not a subject in 
general” (Levinas, 2011, pp. 13–14). 
Subjectification is as radical as the emblematic case that 
Levinas takes from the Bible, namely, the cheek offered to the 
smiter. This example substantiates his basic thesis according to 
which the subject is called into question in the relationship with 
the Other: 
The subjectivity as the other in the same, as an inspiration, is the 
putting into question of all affirmation for-oneself, all egoism 
born again in this very recurrence. (This putting into question is 
not a preventing!) The subjectivity of a subject is responsibility 
of being-in-question in the form of the total exposure to offence 
in the cheek offered to the smiter. This responsibility is prior to 
dialogue, to the exchange of questions and answers, to the 
thematization of the said, which is superposed on my being put 
into question by the other in proximity, and in the saying 
proper to responsibility is produced as a digression (Levinas, 
2011, pp. 111–112). 
Again, just like in the case of other key words from Levinas’s 
account of ethics, such as vulnerability (from vulnerabilis) and 
subject (from sub-jectum), one might trace his powerful 
argumentation on the being-in-question of the subject back to 
the Latin etymology, since, as Benveniste (2016, p. 435) puts it 
in his Dictionary of Indo-European concepts and society, the Latin 
noun “quaestio” means “(judicial) investigation” and also 
“‘torture’ (whence quaestiono ‘investigate by means of torture, to 
torture’).” 
Moreover, the philosophical language at use here, in 
describing responsibility as ‘being-in-question,’ clearly 
addresses, and also attacks, Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, 
which Janicaud has interpreted as “ontological 
fundamentalism” (1996, pp. 227–228), particularly its 
outrageous political consequences, as it has been recently taken 
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up again in the wake of the publication of the Schwarze Hefte, 
Black Notebooks (Farin and Malpas, 2016). In fact, the 
possibility of the ontological investigations presented in Being 
and Time in 1927 lies in the opportunity to philosophically 
retrieve “the questionableness of Being,” which was fatally 
evoked during the formal address that Heidegger delivered 
when he became rector of the University of Freiburg i.B. in May 
1933, during the Nazi regime (M. Heidegger, Harries, H. 
Heidegger, 1985, p. 477; Richardson, 2003). 
This being-in-question that the subject undergoes in the 
inescapable responsibility towards the Other (Levinas, 2011, pp. 
13–14) is ambivalent. Indeed, on the one hand, “the subject is a 
host,” insofar as the conscious life of the subject is attention and 
“hospitality,” that is, the “welcome of the face” (Levinas, 1979, 
p. 299). In the epiphany of the Other, the face and its cheek, 
before any intentional act of welcoming or refusal, signifies 
extreme vulnerability, as well as a calling forth for 
“unconditional hospitality” (Derrida, 1999, pp. 54 and 141). 
On the other hand, the subject is a hostage, “obsessed by 
the neighbor” as much as it is “obsessed with responsibilities” 
(Levinas, 2011, pp. 123 and 112). The “uncondition” of being 
hostage, mentioned at the outset of Otherwise Than Being 
(Levinas, 2011, p. 6), condenses what Levinas means by “an 
obligation, anachronously prior to any commitment” (2011, p. 
101), just like the covenant that Israel makes with the Lord, in 
which obligation precedes the delivery of the basic laws of the 
covenant itself (Exodus, 19: 5), namely, the ten words, or 
Decalogue (Exodus, 34: 28). 
Rather than a condition, the obsession of the hostage goes 
back to a situation, namely, an ethical situation, in which 
obedience precedes the hearing of the order (Levinas, 2011, p. 
150), an obedience that is “prior to any voluntary decision 
which could have assumed it” (2011, p. 54). Therefore, the 
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ethical relationship between the me and the Other takes the 
shape of a very concrete situation, which calls to mind the one 
depicted in the parable of the Good Samaritan (Luke 10: 25–37), 
where responsibility concerns “the first one on the scene” 
(Levinas, 2011, p. 11). 
Obsession, which affects responsibility; persecution, to 
the point of substitution: it is clear that Levinas’s account of the 
ethical intrigue does not entail an optimistic take on human 
nature (Vogel 2008). In his words, responsibility for others does 
not mean “altruistic will, instinct of ‘natural benevolence,’ or 
love” (2011, pp. 111–112). 
Yet, the subjectivity of the hostage is at once the 
subjectivity of the host. As Bernasconi points out (2018, p. 267), 
whereas in Totality and Infinity, the subject is construed as a 
host, in Otherwise Than Being, the subject is a hostage. However, 
to be a hostage can still be explained in terms of hospitality: in 
fact, the-one-for-the-other relationship is not a mere coming 
together of two subjects; rather, it is a traumatic situation by 
which the me undergoes an incessant alienation by the guest 
who is entrusted to it. The subject is not a hostage despite the 
fact that it is a host; rather, it is a hostage because it is a host, 
visited by the upsetting presence of the Other in the Same. 
Alienation thus represents the other side of substitution, 
the key notion in Levinas’s ethics. Persecution can go to the 
point of substitution, in which the me replaces the Other in 
his/her duties and responsibilities, whereas no one can replace 
the me: “the substitution of the one for the other does not 
signify the substitution of the other for the one” (Levinas, 2011, 
p. 158). Levinas’s own idea of alienation, in turn, addresses the 
very identity of the subject, i.e. the “uniqueness” of a psyche: 
“alienation […] does not empty the same of its identity, but 
constrains it to it, with an unimpeachable assignation, 
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constrains it to it as no one else, where no one could replace it” 
(2011, p. 141). 
Starting from this ethical situation, which is characterised 
by obsession, persecution, and alienation, the following section 
tackles the role of the third party and the function of justice in 
Levinas’s account of ethics. The aim is to rephrase the objection 
from the audience that was mentioned in the previous section, 
by asking how a subject, who is not only vulnerable, but also 
alienated, who is a host and a hostage at the same time, can 
fulfill his/her duties by balancing vulnerability and 
responsibility, conatus essendi and original obligation to 
responsibility. 
 
Equal among equals. 
In order to contextualise the argument of this section, it is 
important to note that according to Levinas, egoism and 
responsibility are neither moral choices nor symmetrically 
opposed notions; rather, they are ontological features of the 
same subjectivity, which, in the relationship with the Other, 
finds itself both host and hostage at one and the same time. This 
means that the opposite of the vulnerable subject is not the 
invincible subject. In fact, the vulnerability Levinas speaks of 
has no contrary notion. It is, literally speaking, an unparalleled 
situation that defines the me in proximity with the Other. 
Moreover, this situation is asymmetrical, with respect to 
responsibilities and duties, as has just been stressed at the end 
of the previous section. 
Nevertheless, a counterweight to vulnerability is to be 
found in justice, and in the rectification that the latter entails. 
This issue takes the shape, and the function, of a touchstone for 
Levinas’s ethics, inasmuch as justice begins with the “third 
man” (Levinas, 2011, p. 150), whose presence demands the 
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rectification of the asymmetrical dual relationship that 
constitutes the ethical intrigue. This “third party” is the “source 
of justice” (Levinas, 1998a, p. 83), the judge; in other words, 
s/he speaks with authority, and such an authority upsets the 
dual system of obligation. In the face of the third party, the me 
finds itself invested with responsibility for all human beings, 
not only for its neighbor, so that the very notion of proximity 
acquires a new meaning. Indeed, by its presence, the third party 
rectifies the one-way obligation, and limits responsibility 
(Levinas, 2011, p. 157). It is important to stress that the 
Levinasian notion of justice is pre-institutional, namely, it does 
not trace back to the concept of justice as exercised by courts or 
sovereign States; rather, it is an essential element of part of the 
strategy of the primacy of ethics (2011, 159). 
So, contiguity is extended proximity, in which the subject 
finds itself among other subjects, finds itself as an equal among 
equals. As Levinas acknowledges during the conversation 
mentioned in the second section above, the third party is 
represented in the Other from the very beginning of the 
relationship, that is to say, the relation with another is never 
uniquely the relation with the Other: “in the very appearance of 
the [O]ther the third already regards me.” And with the 
appearance of the third party, “proximity becomes problematic: 
one must compare, weigh, think; one must do justice, which is 
the source of theory” (Levinas, 1998a, p. 82). 
The question of justice in Levinas’s account of ethics has 
garnered an array of problems, some of which were addressed 
by Derrida during the opening speech delivered at the 
conference that took place a year after Levinas’s death. Indeed, 
as Derrida puts it, “formidable problems arise with the third” 
(Derrida, 1999, p. 29). What we might be tempted to call the 
providential irruption of the third party in the dual 
relationship, can be summarised in two basic moves, which are 
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also the effects of the rectification brought about by the third 
party. 
First, the third party “interrupts the face to face of a 
welcome of the other man, interrupts the proximity or approach 
of the neighbor” (Levinas, 2011, p. 150). In this sense, the third 
party brings about an “incessant correction of the asymmetry of 
proximity” (Levinas, 2011, p. 158). Second, the third party 
mitigates the traumatic experience of alterity. Ricœur noted 
(2004, p. 91) that Levinas draws on “extreme terms’, such as 
obsession, wound, and traumatism, in order to emphasise the 
description of the vulnerable subject, generating an ‘escalation 
of the pathic to pathetic and the pathological.” However, the 
third appeases such an escalation, inasmuch as its presence 
affects both the obedience prior to intentionality and the 
obligation towards the first party on the scene. The model of the 
Good Samaritan, which helps in understanding the dual 
relationship, does not apply to proximity construed as a human 
plurality (Levinas, 1998b, 166–167). 
Thus, the presence of the third party is structural to the 
very idea of plurality, of humanity, which represents the wide 
scope of Levinas’s reflections (2011, p. 83). That is why Derrida 
pinpoints a “double bind” in Levinas’s account of ethics, which 
moves in two simultaneous and complementary directions, 
both towards the Other and towards the third party. This 
perspective entails a crucial criticism. As Derrida puts it: “if the 
face to face with the unique engages the infinite ethics of my 
responsibility for the other in a sort of oath before the letter, an 
unconditional respect or fidelity, then the ineluctable 
emergence of the third, and, with it, of justice, would signal an 
initial perjury [parjure],” which is “as original as the experience 
of the face” (1999, p. 33). 
Before any code of law or court of justice, even before any 
planned action or agreed protocol of interaction, the third party 
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is, so to speak, providentially there to protect the me from 
exposure to potentially unrestrained violence within the 
immediate relationship with the Other, which, as we have seen, 
is understood by Levinas in terms of persecution. As judge, 
neighbour of the neighbour, trigger of a plurality in proximity 
that awakens the subject right in the midst of the world, the 
very presence of the third party is, at once, sufficient to 
interrupt the drift of a limitless, unachievable obligation, and to 
disturb the “exteriority of two people” (Levinas, 1999, p. 142), 
as Tahmasebi-Birgani (2014) also notes. 
Furthermore, the ‘formidable problems’ that arise with 
the third party are rooted in Levinas’s basic claim on the 
primacy of ethics over ontology, since the “quasi-
transcendental or originary, indeed, pre-originary, perjury,” as 
Derrida remarks, might be considered “ontological, once ethics is 
joined to everything that exceeds and betrays it (ontology, 
precisely, synchrony, totality, the State, etc.)” (1999, p. 34). 
It was utterly clear to Levinas that an account of ethics 
based solely on the dual relationship with the Other, in which, 
as he puts it, “I owe him everything” (1998a, p. 83), would 
undermine and reduce the very idea of responsibility. 
However, to extend the concept of proximity in order to 
welcome the plurality of subjects involved in the concrete, 
political relationship means also to delve into the dimension in 
which the account of ethics becomes truly philosophical, i.e., it 
points right to the heart of the issue. He expresses this concern 
best in Otherwise Than Being (2011, p. 157): “If proximity 
ordered to me only the other alone, there would have not been 
any problem, in even the most general sense of the term. [...] 
The responsibility for the other is an immediacy antecedent to 
questions, it is proximity. It is troubled and becomes a problem 
when a third party enters.” 
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Thus, proximity must include contiguity. The latter 
concerns a plurality of equal subjects, and, therefore, it entails 
the obligation to compare unique and incomparable others, as 
outlined above. As Bergo argues (1999, pp. 83 and 129), besides 
the face-to-face, we must also consider the ‘side by side’ 
relationship. At this stage, ethics meets politics, that is, political 
problems arise right at the heart of Levinas’s account of ethics.  
In this case, therefore, politics is to be understood as the 
concrete public and institutional space, just like the “space of 
appearance” that Arendt refers to with the Greek term “polis”: 
“the space where I appear to others as others appear to me, 
where men exist not merely like other living or inanimate 
things but make their appearance explicitly” (1998, pp. 198–
199). 
Levinas was well aware of the entanglements of ethics 
and politics, and, in coherence with his main thesis on the 
primacy of ethics over ontology (1979), he defended the reasons 
he considers ethics to be not only before ontology, but also 
before politics, being firmly convinced that “[p]olitics must be 
able to be checked and criticized starting from the ethical” 
(1985, p. 80). 
For instance, he was well aware that the “passivity of the 
hostage cannot exist in an organized society or a State” 
(Levinas, 2000, p. 23). We started by commenting on a 
statement by Levinas, delivered during the discussion of 
Transcendence and Height, in 1962: it is necessary to defend 
subjectivity. This statement was in response to Wahl (convener 
of the lecture), who asked: “You spoke of the State. I very much 
want us to criticize the State, but I also sense its utility. Without 
it, what would happen?” (Levinas, 1996, p. 23). Levinas’s reply 
avoids both a sterile opposition to the State and an economic, 
calculative approach to the worth of the individual’s life. 
Subjectivity must be defended before and beyond any reason of 
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State, before and beyond any cost-benefit calculation, but this 
does not necessarily mean against them (albeit hostilities 
between individuals and the State often spring from this latter). 
Levinas’s take on ethics is not about this hostility; it leads 
elsewhere, by addressing the ethical relationship that makes 
itself known before (and notwithstanding) any societal 
institution. This does not mean that such an ethics does not 
need institutions; rather, it alludes to the fact that the need for 
institutions does not represent the reason that humans create 
societies, and, consequently, that this allegedly originary need 
should not be considered the alpha and omega of political 
thought. 
Moreover, Levinas’s approach remains phenomenological 
when he suggests that politics can greatly benefit from a 
modified grasp (Heidegger, 1996, 167) of the relations 
established within institutions, which are, first and foremost, 
relations among human beings. However, rather than delving 
into that “enigmatic relationship in Levinas’s thought between 
an ethics and a politics of hospitality – or of the hostage” 
(Derrida, 1999, p. 63), the final section will continue to 
investigate the theme of vulnerability, by extending, in the 
wake of Levinas’s reasoning, the scope of the inquiry on 
vulnerability to plural proximity and contiguity, namely, to 
sociality. 
 
Towards a phenomenological approach to politics. Some 
provisional conclusive remarks. 
Vulnerability is a key concept of Levinas’s ethics that also 
extends its signification into the plural, political setting opened 
up by the third party and by the birth of institutions of human 
coexistence. However, Levinas is quick to warn that ethics 
strives to reassert its primacy against the tide of “Western 
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tradition,” in which plurality is construed as “the reciprocal and 
formal alterity of individuals composing a genus,” individuals 
that are “equals among themselves through the community of 
the genus.” In brief, “the plurality of humans” should be 
understood “against the logic of the genus” (Levinas, 1998c, pp. 
190–193). This is Levinas’s ethical take on politics. Ethics 
responds to a logic that takes each individual, in the 
exceptionality of her/his living meaning, out of the genus and 
puts her/him before her/his own an-archical uniqueness, 
which makes itself known in inescapable responsibility (2011, p. 
101). 
Judith Butler’s criticisms, however, stem precisely from 
these same reasons. Indeed, she pinpoints “two dissonant 
dimensions” in his ethical philosophy, suggesting Levinas 
should be read “against himself” (Butler, 2015, p. 106). On the 
one hand, while emphasising the importance of the category of 
proximity, she extends the reach of the notion of vulnerability 
to societal order as a whole, comprehending collective subjects, 
such as entire populations and nations, along with individual 
subjects. On the other, she denounces Levinas’s patent 
contradiction in affirming forms of nationalism, Israeli 
nationalism in particular, in the light of his premises on the 
exceptional significance of the human subject. 
The crucial ontological point around which Butler’s 
analysis revolves is that, in proximity, the neighbour has 
nothing in common with the me, and not even vulnerability 
and precarity can constitute any communal essence. The 
reasoning on vulnerability and precarity, in turn, represents the 
opportunity for critical thinking to understand the relationship 
with other humans. She follows Levinas when she argues that 
we are nonetheless bound up with a rigorous notion of 
responsibility to those we do not know, even to those “we did 
not choose, could never have chosen,” and also stresses that 
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“these obligations are, strictly speaking, precontractual” (2015, 
p. 107), as also Bernasconi remarks (2018, p. 260). 
Butler’s criticisms, in turn, rely on the possibility of 
extending the ethical relation “to those who cannot appear 
within the horizon of ethics, who are not persons or are not 
considered to be the kinds of beings with whom one can or 
must enter into an ethical relation,” with the aim of articulating 
a “global ethics” that is not grounded in or traced back to 
national belonging or communitarian affiliation (Butler, 2015, 
pp. 107–108). 
This perspective is taken up in the conclusive chapter of 
the Notes Towards a Performative Theory of Assembly, where, 
Butler understands biopolitics as “those powers that organize 
life, even the powers that differentially dispose lives to 
precarity as part of a broader management of populations 
through governmental and nongovernmental means, and that 
establish a set of measures for the differential valuation of life 
itself.” She further points out that the organization of life under 
these forms of governance of humans as living beings entails 
that “the status of a subject who is worthy of rights and 
protections” is allocated in a “differential way” (2015, p. 196). 
Accordingly, her approach shifts the focus to the “ungrievable,” 
i.e. to those lives already considered not lives, “already dead 
and gone, prior to any explicit destruction or abandonment,” 
and opens ethical reasoning on this matter to the experience of 
the subjects whose lives are deemed “not worth safeguarding, 
protecting, and valuing” (2015, p. 197). 
With the term “precarity,” as it is well known, Butler 
defines the condition of these vulnerable lives that become 
“unlivable” within the frame of a “daily experience of 
neoliberalism,” since they are exposed to State violence and 
social exclusion, or suffer forced emigration, or are exploited as 
an expendable and degraded workforce to different degrees all 
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over the world. Precarious lives are twice “damaged,” insofar 
as they suffer damage both in the present and the destruction of 
any future prospect (2015, pp. 201–202). 
Besides vulnerability and precarity, Butler introduces 
another key notion, namely, dependency, often falsely reduced 
to an effect caused by the former two basic conditions of human 
social life. What she considers her “stronger point” is the 
importance of understanding dependency as a radical condition 
for human creatures that survive and persist only in their vital 
relation with “sustaining environment, social forms of 
relationality, and economic forms that presume and structure 
interdependency” (2015, pp. 209–210). In this sense, she 
proposes revisiting Arendt’s account of the private and public 
distinction in the classical Greek polis, according to which the 
“disavowal of dependency becomes the precondition of the 
autonomous thinking and acting political subject.” Thus, Butler 
argues in favour of “new body politics” that begin with “the 
critique of that unacknowledged dependency” in order to 
“account for the relation between precarity and performativity” 
(2015, pp. 206–207), assuming that an acknowledged 
dependency can also serve as the ground for seeking to lead a 
good life in a bad life. 
It is not the case here to delve into Butler’s political 
perspective on the forms of plural and embodied resistance to a 
bad life, which aims at articulating “what it might mean to lead 
a good life in the sense of a livable life” (2015, pp. 217–218). The 
present section aimed to stress that Butler’s premises are the 
same as those arrived at by Levinas by approaching ethics from 
phenomenology, that is to say, an account of ethics based on 
non-sovereign, weak subjects defined by vulnerability and 
interdependency (Ferrarese, 2016 and 2017). Secondly, the 
precontractual dimension marked by vulnerability opens up 
the possibility of an alternative take on today’s world, by 
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urging reflections on the “conditions of sociality and political 
life that cannot be contractually stipulated, and whose denial 
and manipulability constitute an effort to destroy or manage an 
interdependent social condition of politics” (Butler, 2015, pp. 
211–213). Through that precontractual dimension, global ethics 
– ethics conceived at the global level, both in space and time –
regains the future dimension, that is, the dimension of which 
the damaged life is deprived. It is clear that there is much more 
than a mere commonality of premises between Butler and 
Levinas, since they both share an approach to politics that leads 
to the precontractual dimension. Furthermore, this path 
towards politics suggests that phenomenology can fruitfully 
contribute to political thought despite the outrageous political 
positions that some phenomenologists may assume. 
As outlined above, Levinas’s account of ethics leads to a 
political dimension that precedes any social contract, and, not 
unlike in the case of Heidegger, Levinas’s path towards politics 
coherently pushes its phenomenological approach to its 
extreme possibilities, which puts any given institution “out of 
action” (to use the Husserlian expression, 1983, pp. 59–60), and 
suspends the validity of the very basic social and political 
conditions within which everyone is born, including national 
identity, constitutional laws, social roles, communitarian 
affiliations, beliefs and ideals, even hopes. The concern Wahl 
expressed with his question to Levinas during the 
abovementioned 1962 discussion, related to the utility of the 
State, should be read in this context. And it is in this sense, this 
writer believes, that in the 1990 Prefatory Note to his Reflections 
on the Philosophy of Hitlerism, Levinas noted that “[w]e must ask 
ourselves if liberalism is all we need to achieve an authentic 
dignity for the human subject” (1990b, p. 63). Such a rhetorical 
question is still valid, a fortiori, thirty years later, and it 
assumes a euphemistic nuance in the face of unrestrained 
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neoliberalism. It is possible for a phenomenologically oriented 
radical political enquiry to rely on the same inalienable power 
evoked by Butler, the power that each and every one of us has 
to think and pose questions neither rhetorically, nor 
ideologically, but reflexively (2015, p. 198). One significant 
question concerns the pluralism of forms of life in the face of 
“the administration of bodies and the calculated management 
of life” (Foucault, 1978, pp. 139–140), performed by that 
biopower against which, not unlike sovereign power, ‘it is 
necessary to defend subjectivity.’ 
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